Specific Performance--What Constitutes Performance Sufficient to Take Contract Out of the Statute of Frauds (Outland v. Outland, 211 N.W. 32 (Mich. 1926)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 1 
Number 1 Volume 1, December 1926, Number 1 Article 14 
June 2014 
Specific Performance--What Constitutes Performance Sufficient 
to Take Contract Out of the Statute of Frauds (Outland v. Outland, 
211 N.W. 32 (Mich. 1926)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1926) "Specific Performance--What Constitutes Performance Sufficient to Take 
Contract Out of the Statute of Frauds (Outland v. Outland, 211 N.W. 32 (Mich. 1926))," St. John's Law 
Review: Vol. 1 : No. 1 , Article 14. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol1/iss1/14 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
thereon, the company cannot thereafter take advantage of a provision
rendering the policy void because of the incumbrance. The question
of knowledge of the agent is a question of fact to go to the jury and
it is relevant evidence to introduce oral testimony to determine the-
point. Cassels v. S. Dakota Theshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 211 N. W.
805 (Sup. Ct. S. D. 1927).
In a case which presented an almost similar set of facts, the subject of
the insurance being an automobile, but where the agent received the
information after issuing the policy but prior to accepting the pre-
mium, the acceptance of the premium did not estop the insurer from
setting up the incumbrance provision as a defense to an action on the
policy when the loss occurred. Prose v. Hawkeye Sec. Fire Ins. Co.,
211 N. W. 970 (Sup. Ct. S. D. 1927).
The court apparently distinguishes the two cases upon a pro-vision
in the policy in the Prose case which does not allow an oral waiver
of condition. It is well settled that where a company retains the pre-
mium on a policy, knowing of an incumbrance, it waives a condition
that if there is an incumbrance on the subject the policy is void.
German-American Ins. Co. v. Yeagley, 163 Ind. 651, 71 N. E. 897
(1904); Cowart v. Capital City Ins. Co., 114 Ala. 356, 22 So. 574
(1897); Neafie v. Woodcock, 15 App. Div. 618, 44 N. Y. Supp. 768
(2nd Dept. 1897). It is also well settled that notice to a solicitor
authorized to deliver and issue policies for the company was notice to
the company. Rogers v. Farmers Mutual Aid, 106 Ky. 371, 50 S. W.
543 (1899); 2 Joyce Insurance (2nd Ed. 1917) 1126, Sec. 439. The
rule has been laid down in New York that the receipt by the com-
pany, through its general agent, of renewal premiums taken by him
with knowledge of other insurance, operates as a waiver of a condi-
tion requiring a formal notice and indorsement thereof on the policy,
although the policy provides that the conditions can only be waived
by a writing signed by the secretary, and it was also held that the
waiver might be by parol. Carroll v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 40 Barb.
(N. Y.) 292 (1863). It is conceded that in the Prose case the ap-
pellant did not have knowledge of the mortgage at the time of the
issuance of the policy, but at the time of acceptance of the premium,
and that therefore the acceptance works an estoppel against the for-
feiture. Lawyer v. Globe Mut. Ins. Co., 25 S. D. 549, 127 N. W.. 615
(1910). The court, however, read a statute into the facts upon which
they declared it would be contrary to the settled rule of the state to
attribute such knowledge to the company. A New York decision laid
down a rule that a distinction must be drawn between an existing
fact which renders a policy void when delivered and the omission of
the insured to give notice of and procure the required consent to a
subsequent act, which by its conditions invalidated it, although pre-
viously consented to. Gray v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 155 N. Y. 180,
49 N. E. 675 (1898). Such a distinction might be recognized in the
two principal cases. In the first, the agent by waiving the condition
gave the contract a valid inception, and in the second, by subsequent
acceptance of the premium, after knowledge of the breach of 'the
condition.
SPECIFIC PERFORIMANCE-W¥HAT CONSTITUTES PERFORMANCE SUFFI-
CIENT To TAKE CONTRACT OUT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUD.-Deceased
orally agreed that the plaintiff should have her home on her death in
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consideration of living with and assisting her in paying expenses of
the home. Evidence showed that the deceased had told various per-
sons that she intended plaintiff to have premises on her death. As a
matter of fact, plaintiff had paid taxes on the premises, and made im-
provements on the property. Plaintiff now brings this action to en-
force the oral agreement, to establish a contract, and that part per-
formance on his part took it out of the statute of frauds, and to have
the court decree specific performance. Held, it was the intention of
the deceased that the plaintiff should have her property and that the
performance on plaintiff's part took the agreement out of the statute
of frauds. judgment affirmed. Outland v. Outland, 211 N. 1W. 32
(Sup. Ct. Mich. Dec. 1926).
It is well settled in New York, Michigan, and other jurisdictions
of this country that part performance of a contract will be suffi-
cient to take it out of the statute of frauds. Riggles v. Erney, 154
U. S. 244 (1893) ; Houser v. Hobart, 22 Idaho 735, 127 Pac. 977 (1915),
43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 40 and note; Martin v. Martin, 170 Ill. 639, 48
N. E. 924 (1897); Dragoo v. Dragoo, 50 Mich. 573, 15 N. W. 910
(1883); Hart v. Life Insurance Co., 86 Kans. 318, 120 Pa. 363
(1912); Kofka v. Rosicky, 41 Neb. 328, 59 N. W. 788 (1894); John-
son v. Hubbell, 10 N. J. Eq. 332 (1855); Sleeth t. Sampson, 237
N. Y. 73, 142 N. E. 355 (1923). There are, however, four juris-
dictions which do not recognize the doctrine of part performance.
3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 803, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina and
Tennessee. Doty v. Doty, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S. W. 803 (1904); Good-
low v. Goodlow, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S. W. 767 (1906); Washington v.
Soria, 73 Miss. 665, 19 So. 485 (1896); Luton v. Badham, 127 N. C.
96, 37 S. E. 143 (1900). What constitutes part performance varies
in different states of the union, and apparently New York is inclined
to be much more strict than Michigan on the question. Sinclair v,.
Perdy, 210 App. Div. 439, 210 N. Y. Supp. 208 (1st Dept. 1925);
Pike v. Pike, 121 Mich. 170, 80 N. W. 5 (1899). The last two cases
note the difference very well. In the Pike case, supra, the court
held that where a son surrendered a lease on a farm on which he
lived and came to live with his parents on their promise to convey
the farm to him on their death, the performance of surrendering the
lease and moving on the farm was sufficient to take case out of
the statute. Whereas, in the Sinclair case, supra, on a similar set
of facts such performance was deemed insufficient.
In the principal case relief was given as the court deemed the part
performance and intention sufficient, but in a leading New York case
on similar facts the court refused to give relief claiming the per-
formance was not sufficient to take the case out of the statute of
frauds. Burns v. McCormick, 233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273 (1920). Per-
formance must be unequivocally referable to the agreement and ex-
planatory without any aid and must point with certainty and definite-
ness to the existence of the contract period. Pomeroy Contracts par.
105, 107, 108; McKinley v. Hesson, 202 N. Y. 24, 95 N. E. 32 (1911) ;
Van Epp v. Redfield, 69 Conn. 104, 36 Atl. 1011 (1897); Ellis v. Cary,
74 Wis. 176, 42 N. W. 252 (1889). An act which admits of explana-
tion without reference to the alleged oral agreement is not enough
to constitute part performance. Burns v. McCormick, supra.
